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I. INTRODUCTION 
Enter Adnan Farhan Abdul Latif,** a detainee currently held at 
Guantanamo Bay and ordered released by the United States District Court, 
District of Columbia (District Court).1  The Government charges “that Latif 
was a member of al Qaeda or Taliban forces.”2  Conversely, Latif maintains 
he was traveling for medical reasons and was never part of the Taliban.3  
The Government bases its opinion on a “heavily redacted” report titled 
[REDACTED] Report [REDACTED] (Report).4  The Report and the 
accuracy of the facts therein are at the heart of Latif’s case.5  The District 
                                                          
** As this article went to press, Adnan Latif was found dead in his cell at Guantanamo 
Bay; his cause of death has not yet been identified.  See Baher Azmy, The Face of 
Indefinite Detention, N.Y. TIMES (Sep. 14, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/14/
opinion/life-and-death-at-guantanamo-bay.html.  This development would not have 
changed the author's analysis, as intelligence reports will still qualify for a presumption 
of regularity in future cases involving Guantanamo Bay detainees. 
 1. See Abdah v. Obama, No. 04-1254, 2010 WL 3270761, at *10 (D.D.C. Aug. 
16, 2010) (basing its order on conflicting testimony and the court’s determination that 
the intelligence report was not sufficiently reliable to afford a presumption of 
regularity), vacated and remanded sub nom. Latif v. Obama, 677 F.3d 1175 (D.C. Cir. 
2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 2741 (2012). 
 2. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at *2-3, Latif v. Obama, No. 11-1027, 2012 
WL 549261 (Jan. 12, 2012) (seeking certiorari from the Supreme Court of the United 
States to reverse the D.C. Circuit Court and release Latif pursuant to the District 
Court’s order). 
 3. See Latif, 677 F.3d at 1177 (characterizing this story as an “innocent 
explanation”). 
 4. See id. (stating that this report details Latif’s travels as the basis for the 
government’s case). 
 5. See generally id. (finding, however, that the Report was sufficiently reliable to 
sustain Latif’s detention when afforded a presumption of regularity). 
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Court held that it was unable to “credit that information because there is a 
serious question as to whether [Redacted] accurately reflects [Redacted] the 
incriminating facts [Redacted] are not corroborated, and Latif presented a 
plausible alternative story . . . .”6  Nevertheless, the United States Court of 
Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit (D.C. Circuit) reversed the habeas 
order and found that the lower court should have afforded the Report a 
“presumption of regularity, requiring the court to presume that the 
information in the Report had been accurately recorded.”7 
This Recent Development argues that the D.C. Circuit manifestly denied 
Latif a meaningful review of his detention due to its application of a 
presumption of regularity to intelligence reports and its insistence on 
conducting new fact finding.8  Part II examines pre-conviction habeas 
corpus claims for detainees held under the Authorization for Use of 
Military Force,9 the different legal standards of a presumption of regularity 
and a presumption of authenticity,10 and concludes with the facts and 
opinions issued by the D.C. Circuit in Latif v. Obama.11  Part III argues that 
the D.C. Circuit erred by refusing to defer to the District Court’s fact 
finding and insisting that the Report qualified for a presumption of 
regularity.12  Part IV concludes that the Supreme Court should have granted 
certiorari in this case to resolve the cloud of outstanding legal issues in 
detainee cases.13 
                                                          
 6. See Abdah, 2010 WL 3270761, at *9 (ordering Latif’s release based on the 
Report’s unreliability). 
 7. See Latif, 677 F.3d at 1185 (noting that no other courts had expressly granted 
this level of presumption to intelligence reports in detainee cases). 
 8. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 779 (2008) (stating that detainees had 
the right to a meaningful review of their detainment); infra Part III (noting the disdain 
the D.C. Circuit has for the Court’s decision in Boumediene). 
 9. See Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 
(2001) (granting broad powers to the President to fight future terrorism against the 
United States); infra Part II.A (explaining how the process for detainee habeas review 
began and subsequently developed). 
 10. See infra Part II.B (explaining that a presumption of regularity affords 
intelligence documents a presumption that, for instance, the interpreter correctly 
interpreted what the detainee said, while a presumption of authenticity would only 
afford the intelligence report a presumption that it was actually the correct report). 
 11. See generally Latif, 677 F.3d at 1175 (explaining the reasoning for continuing 
to detain Latif); infra Part II.C (explaining that the D.C. Circuit overruled the lower 
court on several issues, including the application of a presumption of authenticity to 
intelligence reports). 
 12. See infra Part III (arguing that the D.C. Circuit misapplied the law both with 
respect to the presumption afforded intelligence reports and the standard by which it 
reviewed the lower court’s decision). 
 13. See infra Part IV (stating that the D.C. Circuit requires further guidance in 
order to effectuate a meaningful review of habeas status for detainees). 
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II. BACKGROUND 
A. The Life of a Pre-conviction Detainee Habeas Corpus Claim 
One week after the devastating attack on the World Trade Center on 
September 11, 2001, Congress passed the Authorization for Use of Military 
Force (AUMF), which authorizes the President to use whatever force 
deemed necessary to prevent future attacks against the United States from 
the people who “planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist 
attacks.”14  Since Congress passed the AUMF, litigants have bombarded 
the courts with challenges to the Government’s power to detain individuals 
pursuant to the AUMF.15  The Supreme Court has settled two of these 
issues, but the D.C. Circuit has never allowed a detainee to be released 
from Guantanamo Bay.16 
In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, the Supreme Court declared that the Government 
could lawfully detain enemy combatants pursuant to the AUMF.17  
Following that ruling, the Government established Combatant Status 
Review Tribunals, which evaluated whether individuals held at 
Guantanamo Bay qualified as enemy combatants.18  Several of these 
combatants filed suit challenging their detention in the United States 
District Court for the District of Columbia, and the Supreme Court 
eventually ruled that statutory habeas corpus claims applied to Guantanamo 
Bay in Rasul v. Bush.19  Congress then passed the Detainee Treatment Act 
(DTA), stripping jurisdiction from the courts in Guantanamo cases alleging 
habeas corpus claims.20  Following the passage of the DTA, the Supreme 
                                                          
 14. See Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 
(2001) (authorizing the President to also use force against those who harbored these 
individuals or organizations); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 510 (2004) (stating 
that the AUMF authorized the detention of enemy combatants at Guantanamo Bay). 
 15. See, e.g., Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 779 (2008) (granting detainees 
the right to challenge their detention in habeas proceedings); Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 510 
(establishing that the government may detain enemy combatants pursuant to the 
AUMF, but that certain judicial procedures must also be in place); Latif, 677 F.3d at 
1199 (stating that Latif’s detention was lawful despite questions about the validity of 
the report the government used to justify his detention). 
 16. See, e.g., Lyle Denniston, D.C. Circuit: Last Stop for Detainees?, 
SCOTUSBLOG (Mar. 9, 2012, 3:48 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/?p=140439 
(questioning whether the Supreme Court would grant certiorari in eight new detainee 
cases to stop the D.C. Circuit Court from overturning every release order the District 
Court has ordered to date). 
 17. See 542 U.S. at 518 (stating that the power to detain these individuals was 
necessary and appropriate force as an incident to war). 
 18. See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 733 (noting that the term “enemy combatants” 
was defined by the Department of Defense for the purpose of these tribunals). 
 19. See 542 U.S. 466, 473 (2004) (stating that 28 U.S.C. § 2241 had extended the 
jurisdiction to Guantanamo Bay, but declining to decide whether there was also a 
constitutional right to habeas corpus in Guantanamo Bay). 
 20. See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 735 (explaining that the statute also gave the D.C. 
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Court in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld held that the DTA could not remove the 
Court’s jurisdiction in cases that were pending when Congress passed the 
DTA.21  In response to this move by the Court, Congress passed the 
Military Commissions Act (MCA), once again attempting to remove the 
detainee cases from the jurisdiction of Article III courts.22 
The most important case addressing detainee rights in this area is 
Boumediene v. Bush.23  The Court in Boumediene found that the detainees 
in Guantanamo Bay have a constitutional right to habeas corpus review, 
and that the detainees do not have to exhaust all other remedies before 
seeking this relief.24  Additionally, the Court required that this habeas 
review must be “meaningful” in order to pass constitutional muster.25  
Boumediene explicitly found that meaningful habeas review must include 
the ability to order the release of any individual that the court deems has 
been detained unlawfully.26  Boumediene also stated that, because these 
detainees were being held pursuant to an executive order rather than 
through a formal trial in a court, the reviewing court did not have to give 
the same level of deference.27  Rather, the reviewing court must consider 
both “the cause for detention and the Executive’s power to detain.”28 
B. Presumption of Regularity 
In many cases, courts will grant a presumption of regularity to official 
acts by public officials.29  This presumption allows the court to assume that 
                                                          
Circuit exclusive jurisdiction to review tribunal claims (citing 119 Stat. 2742)). 
 21. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 578 (2006) (finding that the statute 
was not sufficiently specific to remove the Court’s jurisdiction in cases already 
pending). 
 22. See 10 U.S.C.A. § 948d (Supp. 2007) (attempting, once again, to prevent 
Article III courts from hearing Guantanamo Detainee cases, including habeas corpus 
petitions). 
 23. See generally 553 U.S. 723 (2008) (addressing, for the first time, the detainee’s 
constitutional rights to habeas review in Article III courts, outside of statutory grants of 
habeas review). 
 24. See id. at 733-36 (providing a detailed history of the writ of habeas corpus in 
order to inform the decision). 
 25. See id. at 778 (qualifying this requirement by saying that “meaningful” review 
does not mean that the review must be as rigorous as normal court proceedings). 
 26. See id. at 779 (referring to the common law habeas corpus claim, as opposed to 
various habeas claims that were established by statute). 
 27. See id. at 783 (contrasting the circumstances of a detainee in Guantanamo Bay 
with a criminal who was tried and convicted in a court of law). 
 28. See id. (stating that the habeas proceedings do not need to resemble a criminal 
trial, but that habeas must still be an effective means to ensure the detainee retains his 
or her rights). 
 29. See Sussman v. U.S. Marshals Serv., 494 F.3d 1106, 1117 (D.C. Cir. 2007) 
(noting this presumption is to apply unless there is clear evidence why it should not 
(citing United States v. Chem. Found., Inc., 272 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1926))). 
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the public official conducted their affairs properly and accurately.30  This 
presumption applies to both government-produced documents and official 
acts,31 and it is not meant to afford the document an assumption of 
accuracy—that is, the court may find that the facts contained therein are 
inaccurate even if the presumption of regularity applies.32  Courts generally 
confer the presumption of regularity to documents such as official tax 
receipts, court documents, mail delivery methods, and agency actions.33  
The presumption also relies on common sense: the court can readily trust 
these types of documents because they are made or maintained in 
sufficiently reliable and familiar practices.34  In detainee cases, however, 
courts traditionally apply a presumption of authenticity to intelligence 
reports.35  A presumption of authenticity affords the document less credit 
than a presumption of regularity, finding only that the document was what 
it claimed to be, but disregarding the factual content therein.36  Recently, in 
Latif v. Obama, the D.C. Circuit Court ruled that the Government’s 
intelligence reports should be afforded a presumption of regularity, rather 
than a presumption of authenticity.37 
C. Latif v. Obama 
At the District Court, the Government relied primarily on the Report, a 
heavily redacted intelligence report that was prepared as the result of an 
                                                          
 30. See id. (noting that once the defendant has shown clear evidence why this 
presumption should not be afforded, the burden shifts to the government to prove the 
document deserves the presumption). 
 31. See Latif v. Obama, 677 F.3d 1175, 1182 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (allowing a 
presumption of regularity to apply to a foreign tax receipt (citing Riggs Nat’l Corp. v. 
Comm’r, 295 F.3d 16, 21 (D.C. Cir. 2002))), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 2741 (2012). 
 32. See id. at 1180 (noting that the lower courts seemed to be confused on this 
point). 
 33. See id. at 1207 (Tatel, J., dissenting) (stating that these are familiar, accessible 
actions and documents that do not require much scrutiny (citing Riggs Nat’l Corp., 295 
F.3d at 21; Hobbs v. Blackburn, 752 F.2d 1079, 1081 (5th Cir. 1985); Legille v. Dann, 
544 F.2d 1, 7 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 
402, 415 (1971))). 
 34. See id. (noting that these documents are produced in the ordinary course of 
business). 
 35. See id. at 1213 (stating these cases refused to afford the presumption of 
regularity in favor of a presumption of authenticity, over the government’s objection 
(citing Ahmed v. Obama, 613 F. Supp. 2d 51, 54-55 (D.D.C. 2009); Al Mutairi v. 
United States, 644 F. Supp. 2d 78 (D.D.C July 29, 2009))). 
 36. See id. (stating that the District Court has been applying this standard without 
direction from the Circuit Court (citing Ahmed, 613 F. Supp. 2d at 54-55; Al Mutairi, 
644 F. Supp. 2d at 78)). 
 37. See id. at 1187 (majority opinion) (finding that the uncertainty around which 
the Report was made did not mean that it should not be afforded a presumption of 
regularity based on, among other reasons, comity with the other branches of 
government). 
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interview with Latif.38  The facts in the Report are largely disputed on 
either side.39  According to the Report, Latif was recruited by the Taliban 
and traveled to Afghanistan “via Sana’a, Yemen; Karachi, Pakistan; and 
Quetta, Pakistan,” meeting Ibrahim Al-Alawi in Kandahar, Afghanistan.40  
Al-Alawi then took Latif to the Taliban, who trained him to use weapons 
and “stationed him on the front line against the Northern Alliance.”41  Latif 
then fled back to Pakistan with other “fleeing Arabs” and was subsequently 
captured near the Afghan border of Pakistan in 2001, before being 
transferred to Guantanamo Bay in 2002.42  The District Court applied a 
presumption of authenticity to the Report, but declined to afford it a 
presumption of regularity43 because of the significant questions about the 
reliability of the Report.44 
Latif insisted that he only traveled to Afghanistan to seek medical 
treatment.45  He also stated that the Government’s version of events was 
based on a Report that contained statements that were so inaccurate, they 
must have been misattributed to him, or his statements must have been 
misunderstood.46  Latif maintained that he had never been part of the 
Taliban.47  As Latif presented “a plausible alternative story,” the District 
Court found that the Government had not proved that his detention was 
lawful by a preponderance of the evidence, and subsequently ordered the 
Government to release him from Guantanamo.48 
The Government appealed the District Court’s ruling to the Circuit 
Court, arguing that the District Court erroneously applied a presumption of 
                                                          
 38. See Abdah v. Obama, No. 04-1254, 2010 WL 3270761, at *6 (D.D.C. Aug. 16, 
2010) (noting that the Report is not corroborated by other evidence), vacated and 
remanded sub nom. Latif v. Obama, 677 F.3d 1175 (D.C. Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 
S. Ct. 2741 (2012). 
 39. See Latif v. Obama, 677 F.3d 1175, 1178 (noting that if both sides agreed on 
the facts in the intelligence report, Latif’s detention would be indisputably lawful). 
 40. See id. at 1177, 1194-95 (noting later that this route was a strange way to get 
from Pakistan to Afghanistan). 
 41. See id. at 1177 (stating that Latif “saw a lot of people killed during the 
bombings, but never fired a shot [sic]”). 
 42. See id. (noting that the government relied upon a heavily redacted report for its 
version of Latif’s movements to and from Afghanistan). 
 43. See Abdah, 2010 WL 3270761, at *9 (stating that the Report was not 
sufficiently reliable to warrant a presumption of regularity). 
 44. See id. at *8 (noting that, considering the contents, the court could not take the 
Report lightly). 
 45. See Latif, 677 F.3d at 1177 (characterizing this story as a “quest” for medical 
treatment for head injuries he sustained in a 1994 car accident). 
 46. See id. (excluding some redacted information). 
 47. See id. (characterizing this as an “innocent explanation”). 
 48. See id. (finding that other potentially inconsistent comments by Latif were 
unconvincing and did not rise to the level of proof required in this case). 
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authenticity to the Report.49  The Circuit Court found that subjecting the 
Report to a presumption of authenticity also subjected it “to the he-
said/she-said balancing of ordinary evidence.”50  Conversely, Latif argued 
that the conditions under which the Report was made were not sufficiently 
reliable to afford it a presumption of regularity.51  The court, however, 
disagreed and found that the Report contained too many incriminating facts 
to be the result of simple translation error.52  The court next considered 
whether the “clerical errors” contained in the Report were sufficient to 
rebut the presumption of regularity in this case.53  While the court 
acknowledged that the Report did contain some errors, it found that “the 
internal flaws Latif identifies in the Report and the other evidence he uses 
to attack its reliability fail to meet this burden.”54  The lengthy dissenting 
opinion found that the majority should have applied the clear error standard 
when reviewing the District Court’s fact findings, and that the presumption 
of authenticity was correctly applied to the intelligence report.55 
III. ANALYSIS 
A. The D.C. Circuit Court Should Not Have Applied a Presumption of 
Regularity to the Government’s Intelligence Reports Because These 
Reports Are Not Like Tax Records. 
The D.C. Circuit Court erred when it applied a presumption of regularity 
to the Report in Latif because intelligence reports are not prepared under 
sufficiently reliable conditions.56  The presumption of regularity has 
traditionally been applied to documents, such as tax records, that are 
“produced within a process that is generally reliable because it is, for 
                                                          
 49. See id. at 1178 (declining to review the District Court’s fact finding for clear 
error based on this claim). 
 50. See id. at 1179 (characterizing the District Court’s presumption of authenticity 
as a rule that Latif proposed, as opposed to the general practice that the District Court 
had employed until then). 
 51. But see id. at 1186 (finding that the Report was sufficiently reliable despite 
“clerical errors”). 
 52. See id. at 1188 (refraining from assuming that the Report was made in bad faith 
absent a showing of such facts). 
 53. See id. at 1187 (stating that the clerical errors were inconsequential in this case, 
when the Report was considered as a whole). 
 54. See id. at 1186-89 (involving a detailed analysis of the facts alleged in the 
case). 
 55. See id. at 1215 (Tatel, J., dissenting) (accusing the majority of “moving the 
goal posts” by putting the burden of proof on the defense to show that the Report is not 
reliable enough for the presumption of regularity). 
 56. See id. at 1208 (noting that the Report “was produced in the fog of war by a 
clandestine method that we know almost nothing about”). 
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example, transparent, accessible, and often familiar.”57  The Supreme Court 
itself has applied this presumption to tax records, even when produced by 
foreign governments, “because we have no reason to question or be 
concerned with the reliability of such records.”58  As such, documents that 
qualify for this type of presumption are not usually questioned regarding 
their accuracy.59 
In Latif’s case, the Report’s reliability is at the heart of the matter.60  The 
Report was produced largely in secret for national security purposes.61  As 
such, these procedures cannot be “familiar, transparent, generally 
understood as reliable, or accessible . . . .”62  Further, this Report is not a 
mundane record, but one that was made by a translator and a transcriber, 
prepared in stressful conditions, and subsequently redacted to ensure no 
information that could be harmful to national security would be released.63  
The only instance the majority cites for its contention that it may apply a 
presumption of regularity to “processes that are anything but ‘transparent,’ 
‘accessible,’ and ‘familiar’” is a case where the Supreme Court applied the 
presumption of regularity to foreign tax records.64  As the Supreme Court 
itself cited the reliability of such documents as the rationale for deciding to 
apply the presumption of regularity to foreign tax documents, the Circuit 
Court should have also considered the Report’s reliability before affording 
it a presumption of regularity.65 
 
                                                          
 57. See id. at 1207 (finding that “every case applying the presumption of 
regularity” has adhered to this description). 
 58. See id. at 1208 (noting this was the only case that the majority cited to support 
their reasoning for applying a presumption of regularity to the Report (citing Riggs 
Nat’l Corp. v. Comm’r, 295 F.3d 16, 20 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (citing Supreme Court 
cases))). 
 59. See id. at 1207 (absent evidence of error, courts do not need to question these 
types of documents because of their transparency, accessibility, and familiarity). 
 60. See id. at 1179 (majority opinion), 1208 (Tatel, J., dissenting) (questioning the 
reliability of the Report by stating that it was “prepared in stressful and chaotic 
conditions, filtered through interpreters, subject to transcription errors, and heavily 
redacted for national security purposes”). 
 61. See id. at 1208 (Tatel, J., dissenting) (implying this alone could be enough to 
question its reliability for the purposes of applying a presumption of regularity). 
 62. See id. (contrasting the Report with more traditional documents, such as tax 
records, with which the court can be sufficiently familiar such that the government does 
not have to prove their reliability). 
 63. See id. (“Needless to say, this is quite different from assuming the mail is 
delivered or that a court employee has accurately jotted down minutes from a 
meeting.”). 
 64. See id. (claiming that the court had no reason to question whether these records 
were reliable (citing Riggs Nat’l Corp. v. Comm’r, 295 F.3d 16 (D.C. Cir. 2002))). 
 65. See id. (noting that the Report is not familiar, transparent, reliable, or 
accessible). 
9
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1. The Intelligence Reports Are Not Sufficiently Reliable to Qualify for a 
Presumption of Regularity. 
Because the Government has not shown that the procedures for creating 
these intelligence reports are sufficiently regular, familiar, or transparent, 
the Circuit Court should have applied a presumption of authenticity, not 
regularity.66  A presumption of authenticity does not require the same level 
of reliability that a presumption of regularity does.67  In the context of 
intelligence reports, a presumption of regularity includes a presumption 
that the information in the report is recorded accurately, whether or not the 
information itself is factually true.68  In cases like Latif, this creates a 
burden on the detainee to produce more evidence to rebut a document that 
does not have the traditional indicia of reliability that other presumptively 
regular documents have.69  The District Court has repeatedly applied a 
presumption of authenticity, rather than regularity, because of this lack of 
reliability associated with intelligence reports.70 
The process of preparing intelligence reports such as the Report is not 
sufficiently regular to qualify for a presumption of regularity.71  These 
reports are based on multiple levels of hearsay, which makes them 
inherently unreliable.72  They are based on interrogations which may 
involve a detainee, an interrogator, a translator, and a transcriber; 
sometimes several translators, interrogators, or transcribers are involved.73  
The detainee may make a statement in response to an interrogator’s 
question that is then relayed through a translator.74  The statement is then 
                                                          
 66. See id. at 1209-10 (stating that he would have allowed these decisions to be 
made on a case by case basis, rather than applying a blanket rule). 
 67. See id. at 1213 (noting that the Government requested an even more stringent 
presumption of accuracy (citing Ahmed v. Obama, 613 F. Supp. 2d 51, 54-55 (D.D.C. 
2009); Al Mutairi v. United States, 644 F. Supp. 2d 78 (D.D.C. 2009))). 
 68. See id. at 1213 (stating the majority has not cited any cases where the District 
Court expresses confusion about the difference between a presumption of truth or 
accuracy). 
 69. See id. at 1215 (stating that this shift has “called the game in the government’s 
favor” by not only requiring Latif to rebut the presumption of regularity, but also 
finding that the facts on the record did not rebut the presumption). 
 70. See generally id. at 1212 (stating that this standard gives the Report some 
weight, but less than what the Government and the circuit court prefer (citing Alsabri v. 
Obama, 764 F. Supp. 2d 60 (D.D.C. 2011); Hatim v. Obama, 677 F. Supp. 2d 1 
(D.D.C. 2009); Ahmed, 613 F. Supp. 2d 51)). 
 71. See generally id. at 1209; Al Mutairi, 644 F. Supp. 2d at 84 (considering issues 
regarding translation and transcription accuracy). 
 72. See Al Mutairi, 644 F. Supp. 2d at 84 (stating that multiple levels of hearsay 
was one reason not to afford the government’s evidence a presumption of accuracy or 
authenticity). 
 73. See Latif, 677 F.3d at 1214 (Tatel, J., dissenting) (noting this process can cause 
errors in the transcript or report (citing Odah v. Obama, No. 06-cv-1668, slip op. at 3 
(D.D.C. May 6, 2010))). 
 74. See id. (noting that these inaccuracies can be “impossible to detect” (quoting 
10
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relayed back through the translator to the transcriber and the interrogator.75  
This process can be incredibly stressful and prolonged.76  In one case, “the 
Government believed for over three years that [a detainee] manned an anti-
aircraft weapon in Afghanistan based on a typographical error in an 
interrogation report.”77 
This type of error is not uncommon; in Latif’s case, numerous reports 
about him contained discrepancies.78  Additionally, a language expert 
examined the transcript of Latif’s hearing in front of the Combatant Status 
Review Tribunal and concluded after reviewing a tape of the proceedings 
that it contains statements attributed to Latif that he never uttered.79  When 
a translator “in the context of a quasi-judicial [proceeding]” can make such 
significant errors, a translator acting in a highly stressful interrogation 
environment cannot be considered regular enough to qualify for a 
presumption of regularity.80 
These procedures are also not familiar or transparent enough to apply the 
presumption of regularity because the secrecy surrounding the 
circumstances of these reports makes it impossible for the court to 
adequately analyze the Report’s reliability.81  In the context of intelligence 
reports, these two factors go hand in hand: information about how the 
information in the reports is obtained and how the reports themselves are 
made is often highly redacted to protect national security.82  This process is 
                                                          
Odah, No. 06-cv-1668, slip op. at 3)).  
 75. See id. (recognizing yet another opportunity for an error in the Report to occur 
(citing Odah, No. 06-cv-1668, slip op. at 3)). 
 76. See id. at 1214 (quoting Odah, No. 06-cv-1668, slip op. at 3, that “the 
interpreter must understand the question posed and correctly translate it; the 
interviewee must understand the interpreter’s recitation of the question; the interpreter 
must understand the interviewee’s response and correctly interpret it; the interrogator 
must understand the interpreter’s translation of the response; the interrogator must take 
accurate notes of what is said; and the interrogator must accurately summarize those 
notes when writing the interrogation summary at a later time”). 
 77. Al Mutairi, 644 F. Supp. 2d at 84 (explaining that the person who was actually 
suspected of manning the aircraft had a similar identification number as Al Mutairi and 
that number was incorrectly cited as Al Mutairi’s). 
 78. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 2, at *17 (stating that one report 
listed Latif as Yemeni, while another stated he was Bangladeshi but a member of a 
Yemeni tribe, and one report stated that he eventually graduated high school while 
another reported that he never graduated). 
 79. See id. at *18 (noting the expert reviewed the transcript in English). 
 80. See id. (stating these types of reports are not at all similar to documents like tax 
receipts, which usually are afforded a presumption of reliability). 
 81. See generally Latif, 677 F.3d at 1216 (Tatel, J., dissenting); Petition for a Writ 
of Certiorari, supra note 2, at *19 (arguing this is “significantly at odds” with the 
Court’s ruling in Boumediene). 
 82. See Latif, 677 F.3d at 1216 (Tatel, J., dissenting) (“The Report’s heavy 
redactions—portions of only [redactions] out of [redactions] pages are unredacted—
make evaluating its reliability more difficult.”). 
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“highly secretive,” which makes it unfamiliar,83 so the court has no 
meaningful way to decide whether the process of making these reports is 
generally reliable.84  Without a meaningful way of evaluating how these 
reports are created, the reports cannot be familiar or transparent enough to 
warrant a presumption of regularity in their favor.85 
2. The Circuit Court Should Have Afforded Intelligence Reports a 
Presumption of Authenticity. 
While the Report is not sufficiently reliable to qualify for a presumption 
of regularity, the Report is reliable enough for a presumption of 
authenticity because neither side has challenged that the Report is the 
intelligence report prepared in Latif’s case.86  The District Court has 
regularly applied a presumption of authenticity for intelligence reports 
because they are sworn declarations by government officials.87  A 
presumption of authenticity allows the court to accept a particular 
document into evidence without the same rigorous requirements that other 
documents might need, such as calling a witness to the stand to verify what 
the document is.88  This assists the fact finder in a way that a presumption 
of regularity does not; a presumption of regularity effectively requires the 
fact finder to accept the report, and the facts therein, as true.89  On the other 
hand, a presumption of authenticity allows the fact finder to avoid delay in 
the process by accepting the document as authentic, but still make findings 
as to the document’s reliability and accuracy.90  In this case, the District 
Court correctly afforded the Report a presumption of authenticity, and the 
                                                          
 83. See id. at 1209 (stating this point is less expansive than the majority seems to 
think). 
 84. See id. (allowing the District Court to make reliability judgments on a case by 
case basis is more consistent than creating a presumption in either party’s favor). 
 85. See id. (stating that whether the Report is accurate has an effect on whether the 
information contained within the Report is accurate). 
 86. See id.; Alsabri v. Obama, 764 F. Supp. 2d 60, 66-67 (D.D.C. 2011); Ahmed v. 
Obama, 613 F. Supp. 2d 51, 54-55 (D.D.C. 2010); Hatim v. Obama, 677 F. Supp. 2d 1, 
10 (D.D.C. 2009) (finding that a presumption of authenticity was appropriate to give 
the fact finder latitude to give an intelligence report weight depending on factual 
determinations). 
 87. See Latif, 677 F.3d at 1210 (Tatel, J., dissenting); Alsabri, 764 F. Supp. 2d at 
66-67; Ahmed, 613 F. Supp. 2d at 54-55; Hatim, 677 F. Supp. 2d at 10 (stating that the 
sworn declaration does give the reports more reliability than other, unsworn 
documents). 
 88. See Ahmed, 613 F. Supp. 2d at 55 (stating that the “exigencies of the 
circumstances” will allow hearsay testimony into the record (citing Hamdi v. 
Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 533 (2004))). 
 89. See id. (stating that there is no reason to presume the facts contained in a report 
are accurate, especially when many of those facts are contested). 
 90. See id. (stating that the Government does not even necessarily have to offer 
foundation for each exhibit’s admissibility). 
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Circuit Court should not have demanded a presumption of regularity for 
intelligence reports because a sworn statement authenticating the document 
is only sufficient for a presumption of authenticity.91 
B. The Circuit Court’s Insistence on Labeling the District Court’s Failure 
to Apply a Presumption of Regularity as a Legal Error Is a Pretext for 
Conducting New Fact Findings to Avoid Applying the Clear Error Test. 
The Circuit Court had no cause to conduct fact finding at the appellate 
level; the District Court did not commit clear error when it credited more 
weight to Latif’s version of the events than to the events contained in the 
Report because it considered all the facts in this case and made a 
reasonable decision to credit Latif’s version of events over the 
Government’s.92  Because the trial court has the opportunity to view live 
testimony and witnesses, appellate courts must give deference to the fact 
findings of the trial court and review these findings for clear error.93  As 
appellate courts review findings of law de novo, the court is not required to 
give any deference to the lower court’s ruling.94  Because of the District 
Court’s reasonable decision to believe Latif in light of all the evidence, the 
Circuit Court in Latif should have reviewed the District Court’s findings for 
clear error and upheld Latif’s release.95  Instead, the Circuit Court instituted 
a new standard of presumption in order to avoid applying the clear error 
test in favor of the more flexible de novo standard.96  By reviewing the 
District Court’s decision de novo, the Circuit Court also made improper 
findings of fact in its reasoning when it reviewed the facts to determine if 
Latif rebutted the presumption of regularity.97 
 
                                                          
 91. See Latif, 677 F.3d at 1210 (Tatel, J., dissenting) (finding it completely 
inadequate for the majority to rely “on the bare fact that government officials have 
incentives to maintain careful intelligence reports” as authority to grant a presumption 
of regularity). 
 92. See id. at 1215 (stating that the clearly erroneous standard is generally applied 
in detainee cases at the appellate level). 
 93. See Awad v. Obama, 608 F.3d 1, 6-7 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (stating that the standard 
is not different for live testimony or documentary evidence). 
 94. See Almerfedi v. Obama, 654 F.3d 1, 5 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (“The court’s specific 
factual determinations are reviewed for clear error, whereas its ultimate 
determination—whether a detainee’s conduct justifies detention—is a question of law 
reviewed de novo.”). 
 95. See Latif, 677 F.3d at 1209 (Tatel, J., dissenting) (finding the Report unreliable, 
reliance on Latif’s account reasonable, and all the evidence adequately addressed). 
 96. See id. at 1185-87 (majority opinion) (characterizing their analysis as whether 
Latif adequately rebuffed the Report). 
 97. See id. at 1189 (finding, for instance, that everything Latif said corroborated 
portions of the Report, bolstering the Report’s credibility). 
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1. Applying the Clear Error Test in Latif Would Require the Circuit Court 
to Affirm Latif’s Release. 
The District Court did not commit any clear error in its fact finding, 
thereby requiring the Circuit Court to affirm Latif’s release.98  Fact findings 
at the district court level must be given “full deference under the clearly 
erroneous standard or they must be vacated.”99  In this case, the Circuit 
Court reviewed the presumption of authenticity de novo in order to then 
review the reliability of the Report.100  By reviewing the reliability of the 
Report, the Circuit Court took the opportunity to make new findings of fact 
without first evaluating the District Court’s findings for clear error.101  The 
Circuit Court could not have found clear error in order to conduct new fact 
findings because the District Court was reasonable when it found that the 
Government’s version of the events was not credible enough to hold 
Latif.102 
2. Believing Latif’s Explanation for His Presence in Afghanistan Was Not 
Clearly Erroneous. 
The District Court was not clearly erroneous when it believed Latif’s 
explanation that he was in Afghanistan for medical reasons more than the 
Government’s explanation that he was in Afghanistan to join the Taliban 
because this was a reasonable interpretation of the evidence.103  While 
weighing the evidence and possible inconsistencies, the District Court 
reasonably concluded that Latif’s explanation was plausible.104  This 
determination is a declaration of Latif’s credibility—a factual 
determination that may be set aside by the reviewing court only if it is 
clearly erroneous.105  Latif’s story did not contain meaningful 
                                                          
 98. See id. at 1224 (Tatel, J., dissenting) (finding Latif’s story plausible and 
supported by the evidence in the record). 
 99. See United States v. Microsoft, 253 F.3d 34, 117 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (en banc) 
(confirming that there is no middle ground between clear error and de novo, even if the 
Circuit Court disagrees with the factual findings). 
 100. See Latif, 677 F.3d at 1185-86 (stating that Latif must show more convincing 
evidence, superseding that of the Government, in order to rebut the Report). 
 101. See id. at 1207 (Tatel, J., dissenting) (stating that “[a]ll agree that this case turns 
on whether the district court correctly found that the government’s key piece of 
evidence . . . was unreliable” and that this is to be reviewed under a clear error test 
(citing Al Alwi v. Obama, 653 F.3d 11, 19 (D.C. Cir. 2011))). 
 102. See id. at 1216 (citing Awad v. Obama, 608 F.3d 1, 7 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (stating 
that when the lower court hears “two permissible views of the evidence, the fact 
finder’s choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous”). 
 103. See id. at 1222 (finding that even if Latif’s explanation was not complete, it 
was a reasonable explanation that the District Court did not clearly err in crediting). 
 104. See id. at 1222-24 (considering each of the majority’s objections to the District 
Court’s findings and stating that each fails to rise to clearly erroneous). 
 105. See Almerfedi v. Obama, 654 F.3d 1, 5 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (stating that the court 
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inconsistencies that would prevent the District Court from relying on his 
explanation; in fact, the inconsistencies the Government alleged were either 
inconsequential or not inconsistent.106  Given its inaccuracies and 
inconsistencies, the Report was not sufficiently reliable.107  This was a 
factual determination of the Report’s credibility and the Circuit Court could 
only review it for clear error, which it could not find because this 
determination was reasonable.108  The Report contained several 
inconsistencies that damaged its credibility in the eyes of the District 
Court.109  Unlike the supposed inconsistencies in Latif’s story, the problems 
with the Report were more substantial and resulted in discrediting the 
Report.110  Each of these conclusions was supported by evidence in the 
record.111  As such, the District Court was not clearly erroneous when it 
made factual determinations based on evidence in the record because its 
conclusions were reasonable, based on all of the facts.112 
IV. POLICY 
A. The Circuit Court Denied Latif Meaningful Review of His Detention by 
Affording a Presumption of Regularity and Issuing New Fact Findings. 
Latif never received meaningful review of his detention in Guantanamo 
Bay because the Circuit Court erroneously gave the Report a presumption 
of regularity and made new fact findings outside of the clear error test.113  If 
a detainee seeks review under habeas corpus, the detainee must have 
“meaningful review” of their detention in Article III courts to justify that 
                                                          
must judge the persuasiveness of the evidence before deciding whether the detainee 
should be released). 
 106. See Latif, 677 F.3d at 1221 (Tatel, J., dissenting) (arguing that, after arduous 
translations, minor inconsistencies in the story were unsurprising); Abdah v. Obama,  
No. 04-1254, 2010 WL 3270761, at *9 (D.D.C. Aug. 16, 2010) (finding that the 
Government had not put forth sufficient evidence, and that Latif had plausibly 
explained why he was in Afghanistan), vacated and remanded sub nom. Latif v. 
Obama, 677 F.3d 1175 (D.C. Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 2741 (2012). 
 107. See Latif, 677 F.3d at 1217 (Tatel, J., dissenting) (noting that the District Court 
looked at the effect of the evidence contained in the record cumulatively). 
 108. See id. (including issues like inconsistencies in the name of the supposed 
Taliban contact). 
 109. See id. at 1207 (stating the majority found these errors to be minor). 
 110. See Abdah, 2010 WL 3270761, at *10 (finding that the inconsistencies the 
Government points out could have been caused by translation errors). 
 111. See Latif, 677 F.3d at 1216 (Tatel, J., dissenting) (stating that there were factual 
errors in the Report); Latif, 2010 WL 3270761, at *10 (finding that medical 
professionals corroborated Latif’s story). 
 112. See Latif, 677 F.3d at 1216 (Tatel, J., dissenting) (finding that the District Court 
reviewed all the evidence when issuing its decision). 
 113. See id. at 1206-07 (majority opinion) (stating this in part because the majority 
found that Latif did not rebut the Report’s presumption of regularity). 
15
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detention.114  While the Supreme Court has not since discussed what 
“meaningful review” means for detainees, this review must be in a court 
that has the power to release the detainees, and the court must consider the 
evidence establishing why the detainee is held, and whether the Executive 
has the power to hold the detainee.115 
In this case, the Circuit Court has failed to meet the standard of 
“meaningful” review because the Circuit Court gave the Report a 
presumption of regularity and then made factual findings without applying 
a clear error test.116 Because the presumption of regularity essentially 
mandated that the District Court accept the facts contained in the Report as 
accurately recorded, these issues denied Latif meaningful review of his 
detention giving the Government’s case more weight than the District 
Court felt it deserved.117  Latif was also denied meaningful review in that 
the Circuit Court ignored appellate practices and conducted fact finding at 
the appellate level without applying a clear error test.118 
1. Affording Intelligence Reports a Presumption of Regularity Improperly 
Shifts the Burden of Proof from the Government to the Detainee. 
The Circuit Court has shifted the burden of proof from the Government 
to Latif by finding that the Report should be afforded a presumption of 
regularity that the detainee must then rebut.119  While the majority states the 
lower courts do not have to accept that the facts contained in the Report are 
accurate, the District Court does have to accept that the statements were 
accurately recorded.120  That is, the courts in future detainee cases will have 
to find that “in doing the interview, [the translator] correctly heard, 
translated, recorded, and summarized the content embodied in the 
report.”121  However, in cases like Latif’s, where the defense that a detainee 
wishes to present in habeas proceedings is different than the information 
                                                          
 114. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 779 (2008) (characterizing this right as 
“uncontroversial”). 
 115. See id. at 783 (finding that this is especially important when the person is held 
by executive order rather than pursuant to a conviction in court). 
 116. See Latif, 677 F.3d at 1206-07 (Tatel, J., dissenting) (charging the majority 
opinion with making significant fact findings contrary to the District Court). 
 117. See id. at 1226 (“If we take seriously the notion that district courts are better at 
finding facts and determining credibility, then we should be all the more eager to defer 
to their expertise when the stakes are high and when the case . . . rests entirely on 
credibility and how one interprets the facts.”). 
 118. See id. at 1207 (“Finding of facts, whether based on oral or other evidence, 
must not be set aside unless clearly erroneous.” (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a)(6))). 
 119. See id. at 1206 (characterizing this as moving the goal posts on the defendant). 
 120. See id. at 1210 (finding that the circumstances under which the Report was 
created cast doubt on its reliability). 
 121. See id. at 1213 (arguing that this is especially pertinent when the central issue 
in Latif’s case was precisely whether the Report reflected what he said). 
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contained in the intelligence report, the court will consequently have to find 
that he is unreliable.122  As the court will have to find that he did in fact say 
the statements contained in the intelligence report if that report is afforded 
a presumption of regularity, any defense that is contrary to that report will 
be considered an inconsistent statement.123 Meaningful review cannot 
require a detainee to either rebut a presumption of regularity or call himself 
a liar if he wishes to contradict the information contained in these 
intelligence reports as part of his defense.124 
However, the Circuit Court reduces this possibility by failing to clearly 
articulate what standard the detainee would have to overcome.125  The 
Court never states the standard by which the presumption of regularity can 
be rebutted, whether by clear and convincing evidence, or merely a 
preponderance of the evidence.126  Had the District Court erred on the side 
of caution and required the detainee to present clear and convincing 
evidence to rebut the presumption, the Circuit Court could have reviewed 
the District Court’s finding de novo as it did in this case.127  Reviewing this 
de novo would allow the Circuit Court to supplant its views over the 
findings of the District Court.128 
2. The Circuit Court Conducted New Fact Findings to Reiterate the 
Government’s Case and Prevent the District Court from Releasing Latif.  
The Circuit Court made new fact findings in order to reinforce the 
Government’s case to keep Latif detained at Guantanamo Bay.129  Even if 
the Circuit Court correctly concluded that the Report warranted a 
presumption of regularity, the Circuit Court should have refrained from 
reviewing the District Court’s fact findings and simply remanded the case 
                                                          
 122. But see id. at 1180 (majority opinion) (arguing that a presumption of regularity 
does not require the court to find the facts contained in the Report are true). 
 123. See id. (stating this presumption assumes that the translator “accurately 
identified the source and accurately summarized his statement”). 
 124. See id. at 1186 (finding that the flaws in the Report were not enough to rebut 
the presumption of regularity because the incriminating statements were “separate 
statements”). 
 125. See id. at 1185 n.5 (stating that courts have required differing standards of 
proof to rebut a presumption of regularity). 
 126. See id. (declining to decide what standard of proof is necessary to rebut such a 
presumption since Latif could not meet either standard). 
 127. See id. at 1185 (declining to explicitly refer to the standard of review as de 
novo but treating the District Court’s refusal to grant a presumption of regularity as a 
legal question rather than a factual one). 
 128. See id. at 1221 (Tatel, J., dissenting) (highlighting that the majority itself does 
not find that Latif’s story is implausible). 
 129. See id. at 1207 (pointing out several areas where the majority made new fact 
findings aligned with the government’s arguments). 
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back to the lower court for reconsideration.130  Instead, the Circuit Court 
reviewed whether the evidence was sufficient to rebut the presumption of 
regularity, found that it was not sufficient, and remanded the case back to 
the District Court with a mandate that the District Court review the facts in 
this case once more.131  By giving the District Court this reminder, the 
Circuit Court is essentially ordering the District Court to follow its fact 
findings.132  As the Circuit Court has already reviewed the Report and 
found that Latif’s evidence was insufficient to rebut the Report’s 
presumption of regularity, the District Court will be unable to make any 
other finding than to deny Latif’s habeas corpus claims.133  Both sides agree 
that if the facts contained in the Report are accurate, Latif’s detention is 
lawful.134  By conducting its own fact finding to show the Report’s 
presumption of regularity is not rebuttable under the current record, the 
Circuit Court has dictated how the District Court must rule on remand.135  
The Circuit Court has essentially buttressed the Government’s case and 
made releasing Latif under these facts impossible.136 
V. CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court had the opportunity to grant certiorari and consider 
the issues raised by this case.137 Instead, the Supreme Court denied 
certiorari and allowed the Circuit Court opinion to stand, leaving questions 
about improper fact finding and the standards of evidence in detainee cases 
uncertain for the future.138  The current state of detainee law is at a 
                                                          
 130. See id. at 1215 (charging the majority with “engag[ing] in an essentially de 
novo review of the factual record, providing its own interpretations, its own narratives, 
even its own arguments”). 
 131. See id. at 1199 (majority opinion) (characterizing  Latif’s account of the events 
as “self-serving”). 
 132. See id. (reminding the District Court that “even details insufficiently probative 
by themselves may tip the balance of probability . . . and that in the absence of other 
clear evidence a detainee’s self-serving account must be credible—not just plausible”). 
 133. Compare id. at 1221 (Tatel, J., dissenting) (stating that the majority’s decision 
to conclude that the presumption of regularity has not been rebutted leaves little reason 
to remand back to the lower court), with id. at 1199 (majority opinion) (finding that the 
District Court should have the “opportunity to apply the controlling precedent” when 
deciding the merits of this case). 
 134. See id. at 1178 (majority opinion) (noting that because of this, Latif’s case 
depends entirely on the reliability of the Report). 
 135. See id. at 1206 (Henderson, J., dissenting) (“Latif could only dig himself deeper 
into a hole on remand.”). 
 136. But see id. (stating that the only outcome the record supported was to allow 
Latif’s continued detention). 
 137. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 2, at *12 (stating that the 
Supreme Court should resolve what “meaningful review” means in light of 
Boumediene). 
 138. See Latif, 677 F.3d at 1221 (Tatel, J., dissenting) (opining that, even with an 
answer to what the standard of evidence in this case is, the presumption “comes 
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standstill.139  The Circuit Court refuses to allow the District Court to release 
any detainees.140  The Supreme Court should have granted certiorari to 
resolve these questions and decide what the standard in Boumediene means 
in present detainee cases.141 
 
                                                          
perilously close to suggesting that whatever the government says must be treated as 
true” (quoting Parhat v. Gates, 532 F.3d 834, 849 (D.C. Cir. 2008))). 
 139. See, e.g., Lyle Denniston, Ex-Judge: Boumediene Is Being “Gutted,” 
SCOTUSBLOG (Jul. 17, 2012, 3:54 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/07/ex-
judge-boumediene-is-being-gutted/#.UAXXb86ZlhQ.twitter (quoting one panelist as 
saying the detainees are “‘stuck in Guantanamo’ under a legal regime that gives their 
captors every advantage”). 
 140. See id. (“The Circuit Court ‘has taken the capital ‘M’ off of the word 
‘meaningful’ and has taken the ‘full’ off the word, and deprived it of meaning. To me, 
that means it’s gutted.”). 
 141. See id. (stating that the Supreme Court should be monitoring the Circuit Court, 
but seems unwilling to do so). 
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